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“Northeast Asian states seem incapable of overcoming the divides of 
history, historical memory, culture, language, virulent nationalisms, and 
political and economic systems. At a political level, there is no multi-
lateral alternative; bilateralism, though flawed and imperfect, is the  
only feasible option.”1
 
I. Introduction 
 
The beginning of the six-party talks dealing with North Korea’s nu-
clear weapon program and the U.S. offer of multilateral “security guar-
antees” to North Korea in October not only opened new positive per-
spectives for a peaceful settlement, but also the hope of the South Ko-
rean government that the six-party framework can evolve into a perma-
nent multilateral security forum for Northeast Asia after the nuclear cri-
sis is resolved.2 Greater regional cooperation in Northeast Asia can be-
come a unified political and economic community comparable to Europe 
or North America. The perspectives may be better than ever given the 
fact that China, Japan, and South Korea also agreed at a three-way sum-
mit in Indonesia in October to deepen their ties and consider a regional 
free-trade pact. However, the resolution of the nuclear crisis is seen as an 
important prerequisite for the future stability in North East Asia, for a 
nuclear armed North Korea could draw Japan and China into a regional 
arms race due to their lingering hostilities and historical mistrust. Yet, in 
recent months, China has played an unprecedented pro-active role in ad-
dressing the North Korean nuclear problems in ways widely consistent 
with U.S. security interests in the region and beyond.  
                                                
 
1  Paul Evans/Akiko Fukushima, “Northeast Asia’s Future Security Framework: Beyond Bilateral-
ism?” NIRA Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 31-35 (32). 
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While the trilateral co-ordination process among the U.S., Japan, and 
South Korea is producing positive results, and Asian countries taking 
part at new joint naval exercises under the framework of the new multi-
lateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a new “win-win-situation” 
is emerging for the region and the U.S.: “Washington has good relations 
with China while maintaining strong ties with Japan.”3
Indeed, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance is in a much better shape than 
any other time. However, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are also 
complicating the relationships between other Northeast Asian powers, 
such as the already difficult Sino-Japanese relationship. As the result of 
the unresolved crisis on the Korean peninsula, Japan is not only fasten-
ing the pace of its TMD program,  but has even warned that it would 
launch a preemptive military strike against North Korea if it had firm 
evidence that Pyongyang was planning a missile attack.4 Japan’s defense 
minister Shigeru Ishiba even calls for acquiring Tomahawk long-range 
cruise missiles for these contingencies. The defense minister has initi-
ated far-reaching changes (such as buying mid-air refueling tankers 
which can extend the range of its fighter aircraft into North Korea) in the 
Japanese defense policies. These changes heightened the already deep-
rooted mistrust in Beijing about the future directions of Japan’s foreign 
and security policies (such as breaking the “nuclear taboo” in its soci-
ety). Consequently, a continuing “muddle-through” strategy based on the 
current stalemate “neither peace nor war” of the present nuclear crisis 
may have further negative impacts on regional stability in general and 
the Sino-Japanese relationship in particular. According to South Korea’s 
Defense Ministry, today more than 50 percent of potential proliferators 
of weapons of mass destruction at the global level are situated in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Seven out of 17 countries with nuclear weapons or 
weapon programs world-wide are in the Asia-Pacific; 16 out of 28 states 
                                                                                                                                                     
2  See Andrew Ward, Financial Times, November 3, 2003,  p. 7. 
3  Victor Cha, “A Multilateral Deal for N Korea,” Financial times, October 22,  2003, p. 19. 
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with missile programs are in the region; 10 out of 16 countries with 
chemical weapons are in the Asia-Pacific; 8 out of 13 states with bio-
logical weapons programs are in the region.5 It reflects both the potential 
security threats and the arms build-up in the region. 
Against this background, in order to increase trust and confidence 
among the regional states new multilateral security cooperation is much 
needed in Northeast Asia. Until today, Northeast Asia has been notable 
for its lack of an institutionalized mechanism for a regional or sub-
regional security dialogue. Even though the fate of the economic powers 
and of the established polities of Japan, South Korea, and China is inter-
twined through geographical vicinity with that of North Korea as one of 
the poorest countries in the world, Northeast Asia as a politically highly 
unstable region has no comparable regional security framework, such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Even in Southeast Asia, 
regional security forums on “Track One” and “Track Two” have become 
an important instrument for strengthening trust and confidence among its 
members primarily through confidence and security- building measures 
since 1993-1994. Although Northeast Asian states, such as China, South 
Korea, and Japan are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – 
the “Track One” security forum – and despite the fact that the continuing 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula has always been on the agenda of the 
ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 
the most important “Track Two” institution in Asia-Pacific, many re-
gional security experts have also favored a specific sub-regional security 
institution for Northeast Asia which has been often perceived as one of 
the most unstable and potential dangerous hot spots in the world.6  
                                                                                                                                                     
4  See “Japan Threatens Force against N Korea,” BBC-News, February 13,  2003. 
5  See Major General Kim Kook Hun, director of the arms control bureau in South Korea’s De-
fense Ministry – quoted in Michael Richardson, International herald Tribune, June 6, 2002, p. 5. 
6  To the various forms of multilateral, bilateral, and multilateral security cooperations in Asia-
Pacific, and specifically to the involvement of the ARF, see Frank Umbach, Kooperation oder 
Konflikt in Asien-Pazifik? Chinas Einbindung in regionale Sicherheitsstrukturen und die 
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Given the overall importance of the present and future roles of the 
U.S. in East Asia, and specifically in North East Asia and the Korean 
peninsula, the following analysis will first analyze the foreign and secu-
rity strategies of the Bush Administration in general. Second, the analy-
sis will look for some concrete perspectives for a peaceful solution of the 
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula within the framework of the six-
party. In this light, I hope to answer the question of how realistic and 
useful a multilateral security institution is for regional stability in the 
near- and long-term future in (North) East Asia, and what kind of a mul-
tilateral security institution (integration degree) one can expect. 
 
 
II. Shifting U.S. Foreign, Security, and Defense 
Policies under the Bush Administration7 
 
 
“The Bush administration’s new security strategy reflects an extraordi-
narily unbalanced approach to dealing with the threats posed by terrorism, 
asymmetric warfare and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The value of deterrence is downgraded, while preemption is elevated from 
a military option to a doctrine. Little help is expected from diplomacy, 
treaties, cooperative threat-reduction initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar 
program, export controls and international institutions. Just one sparse sen-
tence in this 31-page document is devoted to the need to ‘enhance‘ these 
instruments, which have been central to the efforts of previous administra-
                                                                                                                                                     
AU.S.wirkungen für Europa (Cooperation or Conflict in Asia-Pacific. China’s Tying into Re-
gional Security Structures and the Implications for Europe) (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002), 
p. 395. 
7  This chapter is partly based on a previous paper by the author – see Frank Umbach, “U.S.-
Foreign and Security Policy of the Bush Administration: Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Multilateral-
ism or Minilateralism vis-à-vis North Korea and its Nuclear Ambitions?” Asia-Pacific Security 
Forum 2002: “Asian-Pacific Security Environment: Emerging Realities,” co-sponsored by Insti-
tute for National Policy Research (INPR, Taiwan), The Pacific Forum CSIS (Hawaii, U.S.A), In-
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
184
tions. This skewed approach is unwise, dangerous and extremely burden-
some on the U.S. armed forces.“ 8
“The national security doctrine issued on Sept. 20 packs into just 34 
pages everything the foreign policy of the 1990s lacked. ... It is, in short, a 
bold — and mostly brilliant — synthesis that conceivably could cause its 
author, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, to be remembered as 
the policymaker who defined a new era.” 9
 
The U.S. foreign and security policies in Asia as well as in Europe 
have always been a mix of unilateralism, bilateralism, minilateralism 
and multilateralism. Their concrete mix and outcome depend on external 
factors and circumstances as well as on domestic policy factors and 
“ideological” foundations. 
During the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Asia was determined by 
the global security challenge and rivalry with the Soviet Union. During 
that time, Asian states had to take sides, some even changed sides, and 
others adopted varying degrees of neutrality. The present security chal-
lenge for Asia is rather different: how to navigate between the U.S. as 
the only superpower in the world and “benign hegemon,” and the Peo-
ple’s Republic China as a perceived rising great power which may fun-
damentally change the balance of forces in the region with wide-ranging 
implications for the rest of Asia and on the global scale. 
There is no doubt that a number of Asian nations benefited from U.S. 
military protection, politically as well as economically. Even today, they 
benefit from America’s concentration on the security of Persian/Arabian 
Gulf oil supplies. Although in the 1990s some Asian governments were 
often diplomatically reticent about stating their support for America’s 
                                                                                                                                                     
stitute for Strategic and Development Studies (Manila, Philippines) and the Institut Francais 
des Relations Internationales (IFRI, Paris/France) in Hawaii,  November  9-10, 2002. 
8  Michael Krepon, "Weakening the anti-proliferation fight,“ International Herald Tribune, February 
10, 2002, p. 8. 
9  Jackson Diehl, "Rice produces a brilliant synthesis," International Herald tribune, January 10, 
2002, p. 6. 
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military presence in the Asia-Pacific, any discussions that U.S. policy 
could reduce its military commitments would have been viewed with 
alarm. In many Asian views, any reduction in U.S. commitment would 
mean a commensurate increase in China’s power and influence. Hence, 
U.S. military power in this region had been seen as a necessary counter-
balance to China’s ability to assert its national interests, especially Bei-
jing’s claims to Taiwan and a considerably larger Economic Exclusive 
Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea by many Asians nations.  
With the new Bush Administration in power, the Asian (as well as 
European) views of U.S. foreign and security policies shifted once again 
towards increasing concerns of U.S. unilateralism and its hawkish di-
plomacies particularly vis-à-vis China and North Korea at a time when 
four new multilateral security dialogues were established in Asia.10  
These perceived historic shifts in U.S. foreign and security policies 
also include a move from a multilateral Cold War reliance on deterrence 
and arms control to a new unilateral approach, which accepts not just 
preemptive attacks (as it is often found in the international press) — as 
outlined in the new “National Security Strategy of the United States” of 
September 200211 — but also preventive attacks as a way to defend U.S. 
interests. European and Asian politicians also fear that Washington will 
focus on solving international problems through its overwhelming mili-
tary superiority rather than through more painstaking and time-
consuming diplomatic means. In addition, Asian security experts are 
also concerned about a Chinese-U.S. war that could be triggered by a 
clash over Taiwan. Indeed, during the last years, the Taiwan conflict 
seemed to have replaced even the Korean peninsula as the most danger-
ous hotspot in the Asia-Pacific despite the continuing crisis of KEDO, 
ongoing North Korean missile exports and its arms build-up at the bor-
der to its southern brother state. There are also fears that the U.S. BMD 
                                                
10  See Ralph Cossa, “Asian multilateralism takes on new energy,”  The Japan Times, July 30, 2002. 
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
186
plans will fuel China’s own missile and nuclear weapon programs be-
yond merely deploying more systems that are modern. Such a develop-
ment may compel India, followed by Pakistan, to increase their nuclear 
arsenal. However, some of those concerns are overstated. 
Already at the beginning of the year 2001, President George W. Bush 
declared North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an “axis of evil,” warning that 
their acquisitions of the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) represent a clear and present danger to the world community. 
Furthermore, he declared that all three states are sponsors of terrorism. 
This demands the need to halt their drive to boost their military potential 
— a task which became even more urgent for the new administration af-
ter the 9/11 events of 2001.  
As the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), published on 
September 30, 2001, indicated for the first time since the end of World 
War II, the future focus of U.S. security and defense policy will no 
longer be Europe but Asia-Pacific.12 The QDR also confirmed the poli-
cies of the Bush Administration to enhance the security and military re-
lations with its formal and informal Asian allies, such as Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. At 
the same time, the Pentagon revised its traditional strategy to fight and 
win two major regional conflicts (2MRC) of the Desert Storm type more 
or less simultaneously to a de facto One-and-a-Half-War-Strategy. The 
QDR also introduced a distinction between “defeating attacks” in two 
theatres simultaneously and “decisively defeating an adversary” that 
would require the capability for only one theatre. While at a first glance 
this action means a shortening of the former 2MRC strategy, it would 
overlook the sentence that a decisive defeat could include changing the 
regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                     
11  President of the United States George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America,” Washington D.C., September 17, 2002. 
12  Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Washington D.C., September 
30, 2001. 
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strategic objectives are met.” This, indeed, represents more demanding 
military capabilities than those articulated in the former 2MRC doctrine. 
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)13, delivered to the U.S. Congress 
in January 2002 and explained to the public in March of the same year, 
calls for a draft of contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons 
against at least seven countries, naming the “axis of evil” — Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea, but also Libya and Syria, and even Russia and China. 
To some extent, the NPR 2002 also reverses an almost two-decade-long 
trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last 
resort and redefines nuclear requirements in post-9/11 terms. In the same 
month, President Bush stated: “In preventing the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, there is no margin for error and no chance to learn 
from mistakes. Our coalition mU.S.t act deliberately, but inaction is not 
an option. Men with no respect for life mU.S.t never be allowed to con-
trol the ultimate instruments of death.”14
Despite the focus of the Bush Administration on the Taiwan Strait 
conflict before 9/11, North Korea was also singled out as one of the most 
dangerous threats to U.S. security, not only because of its own continu-
ing missile program, which in its current two-stage configuration might 
be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii and parts of the continental U.S., 
but, also because of its missile exports and technology transfers to South 
Asia and the Middle East. On October 4, 2002, North Korea surprisingly 
admitted that it is still conducting a nuclear weapons program despite the 
Geneva 1994 Agreed Framework and the KEDO program to build two 
light-water reactors in North Korea as a compensation for giving up its 
former nuclear weapons program. Since the “mother of all confessions” 
(which was made public to the world by the U.S. on October 16), Py-
ongyang still aggressively defends its stance, raising concerns in the re-
                                                
13  Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report 2002,” (Washington D.C.: Depart-
ment of Defense, 2002), here “Excerpts,” 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.html> (Search date: February 3, 
2004). 
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gion and beyond that North Korea is becoming the next target of the 
U.S. war on terrorism, its sponsors and WMD. So far, however, the Bush 
Administration has declared that it would not resort to military means as 
in the Iraq case but rather diplomatic instruments. Is that different policy 
towards North Korea a result of the pragmatic recognition that Washing-
ton cannot open a fourth front (after Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and 
Iraq) of military operations? Or, are there indeed also other reasons for 
why the Bush Administration follows a different approach towards 
North Korea?  
 
1. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s in the aftermath of the second Gulf-
war, a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has taken place. It is par-
ticularly driven by the U.S., especially by the interaction of the Pentagon 
planners, the military/industrial complex, and the high technology. With 
a massive investment in new precision weaponry, supported by detec-
tion, reconnaissance and command, control, communication, computer 
and information systems (C4I), Washington hopes to be successful in 
any wars without suffering heavy casualties. Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s 
budget is equal to the combined military budgets of the next 12-15 coun-
tries – accounting for 40-45 per cent of the entire defense spending of 
the world’s 189 states. The U.S. is currently consuming the equivalent of 
the UK’s annual defense budget every 37 days and of France’s every 25 
days.15 Pentagon’s research and development budget alone may even 
make as much as 70-80% of all the global defense-related R&D16, out-
                                                                                                                                                     
14  Agence France-presse, March 13, 2002. 
15  See Edward Foster, et. al., “How to Make Friends and Influence People,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, September 11, 2002, pp. 24-33 (33).     
16  See also Paul Kennedy, “Power and terror,” Financial Times, September 3, 2002, p. 12.  
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pacing not just Germany’s entire defense budget, but also the entire 
NATO R&D investment budget.  
However, the 9/11 events challenged many underlying traditional as-
sumptions of the Pentagon’s contingency planning and its related R&D 
investment. The war in Afghanistan and the fight against international 
terrorism is no longer based primarily on a process of state-controlled 
violence that emerged centuries ago. Paul Kennedy, for instance, warns: 
 
“Yet, ironically, in today’s fractured, war-torn, neo-medieval world it is 
quite inadequate to guarantee lasting peace and security, even in the homeland 
itself, let alone in the protection of US interests abroad.”17
 
Yet, as American military might and technological reach grow to new 
capabilities, any conventional warfare against the U.S. or its coalition 
becomes tantamount to self-annihilation. Because of that fact, the ten-
dencies to new and even more dangerous forms of asymmetric warfare 
will increase, particularly using WMD. In the future, given the rising 
importance of transnational organizations and non-state actors, much 
greater emphasis on urban warfare, special operations and paramilitary 
forces – coupled with increasing threats of WMD by “rogue states” and 
terrorists” — needs to be included into any future contingency planning.  
At the same time, the NPR from January 2002 envisages the promo-
tion of tactical and so-called “adaptive” nuclear capabilities to deal with 
contingencies where large nuclear arsenals are not demanded. Conse-
quently, the Pentagon seeks a host of new weapons and support systems, 
including conventional military and cyber warfare capabilities integrated 
into nuclear warfare if necessary. Thereby, the new warfare strategies 
combine precision-strike weapons, long-range strikes, and special as 
well as covert operations. Envisioning that nuclear weapons “could be 
                                                
17  Ibid. 
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employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack” or in re-
taliation for the use of WMD (a sentence which is not new but in con-
tinuation since the second Gulf-war), or “in the event of surprising mili-
tary developments,” the NPR has, to some extent, lowered the nuclear 
threshold by raising the likelihood of a nuclear war-fighting doctrine in 
order to enhance a deterrence effect on the sides of rogue states. How-
ever, the increased likelihood of a nuclear war-fighting doctrine does not 
necessarily and automatically contradict the traditional understanding of 
weapons of last resort given the need of enhancing the credibility of the 
own use of nuclear weapons to strengthen the deterrence effect on an 
aggressor side. Ultimately, deterrence always requires both the right 
specter of nuclear weapons to be used and the expressed willingness to 
use them. Hence, many critics of the NPR overstate the document by ar-
guing that the Bush Administration is making a radical and dangerous 
shift to a nuclear first-strike policy.18 Pentagon’s plans to build nuclear 
weapons expressly for an attack on a rogue state threatening the U.S. and 
other with its own WMD undermines the credibility of the pledge un-
derpinning the NPT not to threaten a country with no nuclear weapons. 
This problem is not new but inherent since the adoption of the NPT in 
1968. 
It is also fair to remark that Europe’s absence from the debate on Iraq 
for many years and its inadequate defense spending as well as the lack of 
a real Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and common Euro-
pean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) have strengthened U.S. uni-
lateralism in the last years. More than ten years after the Maastricht 
Treaty, which declared the initiation of the CFSP, and four years after 
the Helsinki Declaration of the EU, calling for an ESDP and the 
strengthening of the European pillar of NATO, both policies remain in-
coherent and considerably underfunded at a time when the NATO and 
EU enlargements are already underway, and when both organizations are 
                                                
18  See also John H. Cushman Jr., “Rattling new Sabers,” The New York Times, March 10, 2002. 
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occupied with those extension policies and their related problems. As a 
result, under the roof of NATO as a multilateral security and defense or-
ganization, an European and transatlantic re-bilateralization of foreign, 
security and defense policies is underway due to U.S. unilateral tenden-
cies and the European lack and unwillingness to implement a real and 
credible CFSP and ESDP as well as to recognize global security respon-
sibilities. 
 
2. Rising Differences in Worldviews in the U.S., Europe, and 
Asia 
 
To some extent, there is similarity between European and Asian secu-
rity debates in the 1990s and their focus on multilateral security institu-
tions and pre-existing agendas. Both foreign and security elites have of-
ten focused on the principles and institutions of cooperative policies, 
rather than on the substance of those policies and the resources needed to 
implement them. In this light, the new Iraq conflict does not seem to be 
the real root but rather the result of a deepening transatlantic and trans-
pacific conflicts with their different underlying security and threat per-
ceptions as well as assumptions of the international system — particu-
larly with regards to a common understanding about the use of force 
among the U.S. and its European and Asian allies. Some commentators, 
such as Francis Fukuyama, see the concept of “the West” challenged and 
no longer relevant as well as appropriate for understanding present inter-
national relations.19
However, at the same time, it is also fair to conclude that almost all 
foreign and security issues are a matter of conflict and debates within the 
Bush Administration itself – mostly between the State Department and 
the Pentagon representatives. In addition, one can also state that the 
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ideological right in the U.S. does not represent the views of most Ameri-
cans. By contrast, the majority in the U.S. is reluctant to go to war with-
out international backing, especially from its European and Asian allies. 
Nonetheless, anti-Americanism is spreading even among moderate Mus-
lims in South and South-East Asia as well as in the Middle East because 
of U.S. unconditional support of Israel, and a unilateral military invasion 
of Iraq. 
Undoubtedly, the 9/11 attacks carried out by militant Muslims, and 
the subsequent counter-terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
the Middle East changed the political world. The specter of nuclear, ra-
diological, chemical, and biological weapons by international terrorists 
raised security concerns in Europe and Asia alike. The new U.S. security 
policies have also questioned to what extent the U.S. and its European 
and Asian allies share common values and interests in the future. In 
many ways, the foreign and security policies of the Bush administration 
revealed fundamental and deep-seated differences of worldview and 
have often polarized global opinion. By declaring to wage an open-
ended war against international terrorism, the new Bush doctrine has yet 
to define conditions for “victory.” Steven Everts of the Center for Euro-
pean Reform, for instance, remarks: “It gets close to saying: ‘if the only 
instrument you have is a hammer, all your problems look like nails.”20
Furthermore, many countries, such as Russia, China or the Central 
Asian states instrumentalized the “war on terrorism” in order to meet 
their own domestic objectives, such as fighting irredentist or separatist 
movements at home or suppressing minorities or dissident political 
groups. The current debates on unilateral versus multilateral or minilat-
eral approaches towards statecraft cut to the heart of the role of interna-
tional law. U.S. government opposition to the establishment of the per-
manent International Criminal Court in The Hague is one of the manifes-
                                                                                                                                                     
19  Francis Fukuyama, "Das Ende des Westens," Die Welt,  September 3, 2002. 
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tations of the divide between the U.S. and its European and many of its 
Asian allies.  
On the other hand, the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations are 
better than ever. However, one should not disregard that in both coun-
tries the foreign and security policy elites are very suspicious of the U.S. 
long-term interests and strategies framed in the fight against interna-
tional terrorism. Both elites are very concerned or at least ambivalent 
about U.S. military bases in Central Asia and enhancing military ties 
with its allies as well as other states in East, South-East, and South-Asia, 
despite the fact that Russia and China fight their own civil wars against 
Islamic threats in the Caucasus and Xinjiang region. 
 
3. The Discussion of Preemptive Strikes 
 
Already in June 2002, in an address to the West Point military acad-
emy President George W. Bush announced that the United States could 
not let its enemies strike first. The unveiled new National Security Strat-
egy (NSS) — the first comprehensive explanation of the Bush admini-
stration’s foreign policy — on September 20, 2002 declared the support 
of human dignity, democracy, and freedom of conscience as the key 
goals of an overall U.S. strategy that puts counter-terrorism at the center 
of the security policy. In the view of many commentators, the NSS de-
fines the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment as virtually 
obsolete. This interpretation needs to be challenged when one reads the 
entire document carefully.  
However, the proclaimed need for preemptive military action indi-
cates a wider interpretation of “preemptive" strikes beyond the tradi-
tional standard of imminent threat that opens the door to the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                     
20  Charles Recknagel, “U.S./EU: As Congress Debates Iraq, Europeans See Growing American 
Unilateralism,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Analyses, October 3, 2002. 
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of preventive strikes and wars. This new emphasis on preemption pro-
voked considerable criticism, though it is often misplaced those criticism 
is based on the NSS. Unlike many international press reports (which of-
ten repeat many interpretations and comments instead of relying on a 
careful analysis and entire reading of the document itself), the NSS did 
not abandon deterrence or did not make preemption the main focus of 
the document or the entire U.S. security and defense policy. Indeed, the 
document even acknowledges that preemption will not be the appropri-
ate strategy to counter all emerging threats. The NSS discusses preemp-
tion rather exclusively in the context of how to deal with “terrorists of 
global reach” and “rogue states.” This document is based on the correct 
conclusion that deterrence and threats of retaliation will not work to-
wards international terrorists who proclaim a holy war against the West 
and who are willing to sacrifice themselves. In this regard, the argument 
of the NSR is persuasive in many respects. 
However, the main conclusions of the NSS are also based on the as-
sumption that the spread of sensitive technologies and WMD cannot be 
stopped, and that it is real and no longer just a hypothetical, theoretical, 
and distant assumption. Yet, the NSR does not offer any specification 
what form preemption may take in a concrete threat scenario. Attacking 
other states simply on the suspicion that they might one day in the future 
try to attack the United States — which is basically a preventive and not 
a preemptive strategy — raises fundamental questions with regards to 
the entire international system and international law. In this context, it is 
also necessary to remember that already the Clinton government justi-
fied the cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on 
preventive grounds in 1998. Given the number of practical political and 
military difficulties inherent in a concept of preemption to adopt, one has 
to be skeptical of the fact that preemption will become the overriding 
principle and guiding concept for defining the future U.S. foreign, secu-
rity, and defense policies. Moreover, the risks of a preemption concept 
may indeed increase the dangers of unintended consequences, such as 
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long-term campaigns and contradict what the NSR envisions: “The rea-
sons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause 
just.” However, in general, I agree with those U.S. experts who have 
pointed out that the U.S. strategy of preemption does not imply that 
America will suddenly launch military strikes whenever and wherever 
with no warning in advance. As Richard Haas, head of the Planning 
Staff of the State Department has recently concluded in a broader con-
text: “Counterterrorism, by contrast, is a priority, not an organizing prin-
ciple for American foreign policy.”21 However, not all experts and offi-
cials in the Pentagon might share this opinion.  
 
4. The Lack of Multilateral Security Institutions in (North) 
East Asia and the Policies of the Bush Administration 
 
“The fundamental security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is to trans-
form the balance-of-power approach proposed by those who advocate a multi-
polar global power structure into one that instead aims to produce security 
communities in which disputes are not resolved by threats or the employment 
of force. The process will be one of building bilateral security relationships to 
form a web of regional relationships and capabilities that reinforce security for 
individual states, discouraging armed aggression as a way of settling disputes, 
and developing habits of regional military cooperation and professional mili-
tary behavior.”22
While many academic experts see multilateralism as the order of the 
day in East Asia, the Bush Administration has been accused of focusing 
on unilateral foreign and security strategies in which multilateral secu-
rity institutions play a minor role. Although since the mid-1990s the 
Clinton government strengthened its support for multi-regionalism and 
                                                
21  Stephen Fidler, Financial Times, September 21-22, 2002, p. 5. 
22  See the former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Dennis C. Blair and 
John T. Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” 
Washington Quarterly (Winter 2001), pp. 7-17 (15 f.). 
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regional security institutions, such as the ARF and CSCAP23, it never se-
riously contemplated about a sub-regional security institution for North 
East Asia. From the very beginning, the Bush Administration has been 
even more skeptical of the usefulness of multilateralism for U.S. national 
security interests and has focused on its ever growing military superior-
ity as its primary instrument of national security policies. The shifts in 
U.S. strategies during the last years, combined with a perceived lack of 
diplomatic pro-activity, caused alarm and mistrust in Washington’s poli-
cies in Europe and Asia alike. By rather neglecting diplomatic instru-
ments and channels, those tendencies and shifts in the U.S. foreign and 
security policies in favor of unilateralism, hegemony, or even an 
“American empire” have also been criticized by many U.S. experts and 
commentators. Leon Fuerth, former national security adviser to Vice 
President Al Gore, for instance, criticized the Bush Administration in 
September 2002: 
 
“... it is not surprising that from time to time senior Japanese officials re-
lease trial balloons about a nuclear option. The policies and attitudes of the U-
nited States under the Bush Administration tend to make the problems of both 
these alliances [in Europe and in Asia] substantially worse. The United States 
is at present deconstructing its alliances. Unilateralism, triumphalism, 
exceptionalism and, often, simple arrogance now mark Washington’s ap-
proach. It demonstrates by word and by deed that allies and alliances do not 
matter enough to constrain it. And, each time it does this, it advances toward 
the culmination of a self-fulfilling prophecy. America will end up operating 
alone in the world. The Bush administration aims to fundamentally alter for-
eign policy. What is to be abandoned is the goal of a world system based on 
multilateral institutions, underwritten by security alliances anchored in the 
United States. In place of these things, what is intended is a world order serv-
ing U.S. interests, based on U.S. military and economic primacy, although to 
                                                
23  Ibid. 
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the maximum extent possible avoiding American engagement in long-range 
tasks.”24
 
Historically, too, multilateralism in East Asia never became such a 
prominent organizing principle for U.S. foreign and security policies as 
in Europe.25  Similar ideational factors, such as shared Western and 
European democratic cultures for constructing a more robust regional 
identity have never existed in East Asia comparable with Europe. Nor 
were the strategic interests of all players in East Asia to tie the United 
States to East Asia on a long-term basis so strong as in Western Europe. 
Moreover, national security cultures in East Asia were far more diverse 
and many Asian states were or some even still fear a re-emergence of 
Japan as an “imperialist power” (such as China and South Korea) which 
all hinder the constitutive processes very much needed for the creation 
or recreation of collective regional identities. In general, the “weakness 
of identification with Asia and the belief that the Asian countries be-
longed to a different and inferior political community led to a U.S. pref-
erence for bilateralism in Asia” as a new analysis in the summer 2002 
concluded by comparing U.S. security policies in Europe and Asia after 
1945.26 Against this background, this analysis explaining why the U.S. 
preferred multilateral organizing principles in Europe and bilateral ones 
in Asia also points out that: 
 
                                                
24  Leon Fuerth, “A second-generation alliance system,” International Herald Tribune, September 
12, 2002, p. 4. 
25  On the background see also Joern Dosch, “Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and the Role of the 
United States,” in Joern Dosch and Manfred Mols (eds.), International Relations in the Asia-
Pacific. New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation (Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 2000) and 
(New York: St. Martins press, 2000), pp. 87-110, and idem, Die HeraU.S.forderung des Multi-
lateralismU.S.: Amerikanische Asien-Pazifik-Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (The Challenge of 
Multilateralism. American Asia-Pacific Policies after the Cold War), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2002) 
26  Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective 
Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, Vol. 56, 
No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-607 (598). 
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“Instead of fully embracing multilateralism and a common Asian-Pacific 
identity, the United States has limited its actions to calls for increased multilat-
eral cooperation among the states of Asia while the United States pursues what 
the U.S. ambassador to South Korea calls an ‘enriched bilateralism.’ While 
there is much talk of the common interests the United States has with other 
Asian states, the United States is still far embracing an identity as a member of 
the Asian-Pacific community similar to its membership in the North Atlantic 
community that would be needed to sustain a multilateral commitment.”27
 
Instead of applying multilateral frameworks in Northeast Asia, the 
security framework of Northeast Asia was built on bilateral alliances be-
tween the United States with Japan and South Korea as well as “con-
certed bilateral” diplomatic arrangements for state-to-state communica-
tion and negotiation. Neither political integration nor the idea that peace 
can be built and guaranteed by democratic regimes throughout the region 
were accepted as alternative forms of a regional security order. Only 
“Track Two” processes, involving government officials in their private 
capacities together with academic experts, journalists, and others were 
initiated:   
 
• The Canadian initiated North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue 
involving participants from eight countries (Canada, China, Japan, 
North and South Korea, Mongolia, Russia, and the U.S.); 
• The Northeast Asia C-operation Dialogue, initiated in October 1993 
by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Co-
operation (IGCC) with experts from the U.S., China, Japan, South 
Korea, Russia, but not North Korea; 
                                                
27  Ibid., p. 602.  
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• North Pacific Working Group of CSCAP, co-chaired by Canada and 
Japan, which also includes some of the ASEAN countries as well as 
academic experts from Taiwan; and 
• More than sixty programs of bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral 
track-two meetings in Northeast Asia and North Pacific.28
 
In general, all these multilateral dialogue frameworks and even the 
ARF only slowly developed a shared understanding of basic concepts 
and the needed habits as well as customs of consultation. Moreover, all 
these discussions focused hitherto primarily on threat perceptions and 
confidence-building measures rather than on concrete management of 
regional security challenges. Yet, even those track-two processes and 
their constrained security agendas have not been transformed entirely 
into formal governmental ones due to key countries and their unwilling-
ness or hesitance to do so. Furthermore, although they enhanced state-to-
state relations, state building, and elite interaction, and helped to create 
“epistemic communities” (transnational networks of Academic experts, 
diplomats, and higher-ranked officers), they did not contribute signifi-
cantly to the creation of civil societies in a broader sense neither at the 
domestic nor at the regional level. 
Today, for Washington, even NATO in Europe seemed to have 
played a marginal role only. The alliance had been weakened by Wash-
ington’s preference of “coalitions of the willing” rather than seeking a 
common sense and developing joint security strategies within the entire 
organization. In Northeast Asia, too, there is increasing concern about 
whether the U.S. is a strategic partner capable of playing the multiplicity 
of diplomatic roles and developing adequate and sophisticated strategies 
which the difficult relationships among the states require in the region. 
Against this background of shifting U.S. foreign, security, and defense 
                                                
28  See Paul Evans and Akiko Fukushima, op. cit.,  p. 33. 
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policies with more unilateralist tendencies but not disregarding bilateral, 
minilateral or multilateral approaches when they seem appropriate and 
useful for U.S. national security interests, North Korea (after Iraq) has 
meanwhile become another test case for the policy shifts in Washington. 
 
 
III. North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions and the 
Implications of Pyongyang’s Confession for U.S.-
Foreign and Security Policies 
 
1. The October 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO29 
 
The October 1994 Agreed Framework provides the establishment of 
a multinational consortium which will finance and supply North Korea 
with two light water reactors (LWRs) originally by the target 2003. In 
return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program immediately; it 
pledged not to refuel its Yongbyon reactor; it undertook to halt construc-
tion of another reactor at that side and of another one at Taechon; and it 
agreed to seal the Yongbyon plutonium separation plant and the fabrica-
tion plant at the site, and to leave the spent fuel discharged from the 
smaller reactor in June 1994 in storage without plutonium separation. To 
                                                
29  The following analysis is based, inter alia, on former publications by the author – see Frank 
Umbach, Cooperation or Conflict in Asia-Pacific?, op. cit., p. 285 ff.; idem, “Strategic Trends of 
Global Denuclearization and Nuclearization - Implications for Japan's Security Policies, Re-
gional Stability and the TMD-Debate in East Asia,” Hiroshima Peace Science, No. 27, (April 
2001), pp. 63-118.; idem, “Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-
operation - A View from Europe,” in Kurt W. Radtke and Raymond Feddema (eds.), Compre-
hensive Security in Asia. Views from Asia and the West  on a Changing Security Environment 
and Their Implications for Europe (Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill 2000), pp. 66-133 (91 ff.); 
idem., “Nuclear Energy Issues – Global Dimensions and Security Challenges,“ in Bruno Ter-
trais (ed.), Nuclear Issues in the Post-September 11 Era (Paris: Fondation pout la Recherche 
Stratégique, 2003), pp. 25-46. 
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offset the energy deficit which North Korea claimed it would face by the 
freezing of its reactors and related facilities, the U.S. was to arrange to 
deliver to North Korea heavy oil for heating and electricity production 
“that will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually.” This grant of heavy oil 
would stop with the completion of the first LWR. 
Furthermore, the Agreed Framework also provided steps toward the 
normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. The 
Framework paved the way for U.S. assurances against the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons against the North, and for a North Korean commit-
ment to implement the 1991-92 North-South Declaration on the De-
Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For the first time, North Korea 
also agreed to allow IAEA inspection of the two undeclared waste sites, 
which helped to reveal some of the history of its past plutonium produc-
tion to a certain extent.  
As a byproduct of the agreement, the construction of the LWRs re-
quired hundreds of South Korean engineers, technicians, and laborers to 
work, to live, and to socialize in the North for a decade. This step would, 
as the West hoped, improve the chances for more normal relations be-
tween Pyongyang and Seoul and lift, at least partially, the veil of secrecy 
surrounding the North. In this light, KEDO is seen as the first multilat-
eral security institution (albeit for specific purposes), whereas the 
Agreed Framework of 1994 could be considered as the centerpiece of a 
broader diplomatic effort made by the U.S. and the international com-
munity to integrate the DPRK into the world community and restrain 
North Korea’s “rogue” behavior through systematic engagement. How-
ever, the Agreed Framework does not provide a framework for North 
Korea’s ballistic missile development, deployment, tests, and exports. 
Until the confession in October 2002, Pyongyang has continued to 
observe the October 1994 Agreed Framework and a moratorium on mis-
sile launches as it negotiates with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. At 
the same time, however, North Korea has continued its missile develop-
ment short of test launches (indeed, it has only suspended testing of 
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long-range ballistic missiles), and has sold missiles as well as missile 
technology to customers around the globe. But those ballistic missile de-
velopments and exports have security implications for South Asia, the 
Middle East, and even for Europe as well as the U.S.30
When North Korea tested its Taepo-Dong-I missile over Japan at the 
end of August 1998 while constructing a suspicious underground site, it 
threatened the Agreed Framework and thus the entire KEDO-process 
aimed at discouraging nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. 
The discovered secret proliferation network among North Korea, Paki-
stan, and Iran explains why these three countries Pyongyang have made 
such substantial progress in their missile development and, perhaps, 
even their nuclear weapons programs. 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail strategies, including the 
refusal of giving international inspectors full access to its nuclear sites; 
the country’s continued missile and technology exports to Pakistan and 
Iran; the launch of a Taepo-Dong-I on 31 August 1998; and revelations 
of a vast underground facility under construction which U.S. intelligence 
sources identified as the site of a reactor or reprocessing plant led to 
calls for a comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S. policies towards North 
Korea. Hence, Pyongyang’s policies of blackmail undermined the Octo-
ber 1994 Agreed Framework and thus. called into question the KEDO-
process for freezing the DPRK’s plutonium program.  
In early 1998, North Korea warned Washington that it would aban-
don the Agreed Framework if the U.S. failed to implement its part of the 
deal, namely the timely shipping of heavy fuel to the DPRK. Following 
intensive discussions with Washington and Seoul in October 1998, To-
kyo stopped withholding the $ 1 billion it had earlier pledged to KEDO 
for the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea. How-
                                                
30  See also Frank Umbach, “World Gets Wise to Pyongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail – Part One,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review (September 1999), pp. 33-36; “Part Two,” ibid., (October 1999), pp. 
35-39. 
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ever, no short-term solution could be found for either the nuclear pro-
gram or the missile problem.  
By October 2002, when North Korea confessed to have had a parallel 
Uranium-program since at least 1997, the Agreed Framework only 
stopped the production of plutonium at the Yongbyon Atomic Energy 
Research Center. Whether that meant halting or severely curtailing 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program became increasingly question-
able. The discovery of a secret underground facility in 1998 – presuma-
bly to be Used for nuclear purposes in violation of the 1994 agreement – 
by U.S. intelligence satellites once again raised international concerns 
that Pyongyang was hiding an active and advancing nuclear weapons 
program. Furthermore, the realization of the fact that the Agreed 
Framework cannot stop North Korea’s ballistic missile programs has 
aggravated the crisis since 1998.  
Given that North Korea views its missile capability as its last trump 
card when trying to entice Washington into negotiations over the with-
drawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, future prospects of the Agreed 
Framework at first glance appeared to be rather poor. Furthermore, the 
DPRK was suspected of producing sufficient plutonium to construct 2-6 
bombs. With continued submarine and special forces incursions into the 
South, ongoing tunneling under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and 
several preparations for new missile tests under way since late 1998, the 
present situation on the Korean peninsula seemed just as tense as it was 
before the signing of the Agreed Framework in 2000/2001.  
Against this background, a growing number of U.S. experts and poli-
ticians called for a fundamental diplomatic review in a broader context 
of arms control measures to be applied to the Korean peninsula. Even 
those experts who still favored continuing with rather than abandoning 
the Agreed Framework, argued in favor of a ”new deal” incorporating 
“new issues of concern by supplementing it (the Agreed Framework) 
with new and more comprehensive commitments,” for otherwise it could 
be impossible to save it. What was indeed lacking in U.S. policies to-
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wards North Korea was a comprehensive, long-term strategy that creates 
a common framework for Agreed Framework/KEDO issues, U.S.-DPRK 
missile talks, and related initiatives.  
Furthermore, according to the accord, the inspection of the two unde-
clared sites had been postponed for an extended period (four to six 
years), creating a special safeguard status for North Korea. The inspec-
tion problems for verification of North Korea’s past weapons program 
and an indication for ongoing research of nuclear weaponry had never 
been solved effectively until Pyongyang’s confession. The IAEA, for in-
stance, had been allowed to conduct routine and ad hoc inspection of 
“unfrozen” nuclear facilities but not of the reprocessing plant. Moreover, 
the IAEA could only measure but not analyze the spent fuel. Many sus-
picious underground facilities could not be inspected until today because 
of a failing comprehensive and effective inspection regime. Hence, a 
considerable part of North Korea’s previous nuclear weapon program 
and many nuclear facilities have remained unmonitored since the signing 
of the Agreed Framework in October 1994. According to IAEA inspec-
tors, the information and access provided by Pyongyang had been insuf-
ficient which would allow to get a complete picture of the North Korean 
nuclear weapons program. 
Therefore, other countries and many foreign experts (particularly in 
the U.S. Congress) remained suspicious about whether North Korea had 
really stopped working not only on the development of nuclear but also 
of biological and chemical weapons (the latter are not covered by the 
Agreed Framework; North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons 
Convention/BWC, but not to the Chemical Weapons Convention/CWC). 
Although the May 1999 Kumchang-ri31 inspection carried out by fifteen 
U.S. experts under the direction of former secretary of defense Dr. Wil-
liam Perry, for instance, did not produce evidence for the previous or in-
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tended production of weapons-grade plutonium or reprocessing activiti-
es32, the site could support the respective facilities in the future if sub-
stantially modified according to the Perry-report.  
Furthermore, even though the U.S. State Department had initially in-
sisted on the promised food aid project with 100,000 tons for the famine-
hit North Korea to be a separate matter and that no quid pro quo deal had 
been signed, later, however, it became known that the U.S. indeed 
agreed to pay a ‘visit fee’ only for the s suspicious pected underground 
facility. Hardly surprising, the new ‘food for access‘-agreement could 
not satisfy many critical voices in the U.S. Congress which dismissed 
Clinton’s engagement policy towards North Korea as ‘appeasement.’ In 
the view of those critics, the ‘potato diplomacy’ could have only 
strengthened North Korea’s blackmail policies towards the U.S., South 
Korea, and Japan. After more than six months which passed since the 
first s suspicious over the site emerged, North Korea had enough time to 
clear that facility and to move its suspected nuclear weapons program to 
another underground facility which was not covered by the Agreed 
Framework. 
Against the background of the failing achievements of the Agreed 
Framework and the KEDO program, the Australian expert Andrew 
Mack reminds U.S. in October 2002: 
 
 “The critics were right — it was an unfortunate agreement and it created a 
worrying precedent. But it was also the best deal that could have been negoti-
ated at the time. It avoided war and stopped a nuclear weapons program that, 
within a very few years, would have produced enough surplus fissile material 
                                                                                                                                                     
31  On Kumchang-ri and other nuclear facilities in North Korea see in particular Joseph S. Ber-
mudez Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure – Part One,” Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review (July 1999), pp. 36-41; “Part Two,” ibid.,  (August 1999). 
32  The team was permitted to measure all underground areas and to take soil and water samples. 
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for the cash-stripped North Koreans to export to other pariah states – like 
Iraq.”33
 
IV. Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement of the Nu-
clear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the Impli-
cations for Future Multilateralism in Northeast 
Asia 
 
“Its reckless political, economic and military pressure is most 
seriously threatening the DPRK’s right to existence, creating a 
grave situation on the Korean Peninsula. Nobody would be so na-
ïve as to think that the DPRK would sit idle under such situation. 
That was why the DPRK made itself very clear to the special en-
voy of the US president that the DPRK was entitled to possess 
not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon … to defend its 
sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear 
threat by the US The DPRK has neither need nor duty to explain 
something to the US, seeking to attack it if it refuses to disarm it-
self. Nevertheless, the DPRK, with greatest magnanimity, clari-
fied that it was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of this issue 
… .” 34
 
“This approach to nuclear proliferation challenges many of the stereotypes 
of the Bush administration’s ‘unilateralist’ foreign policy. But it has also an-
gered conservatives at the heart of the administration, exposing the limits of 
                                                
33  Andrew Mack,  “A huge Headache for Washington,” International herald Tribune, October 24, 
2002, p. 4. 
34  See the official comment by North Korea – see Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “Con-
clusion of Non-Aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for Pyongyang,” October 25, 
2002, here following NAPSNET-Daily Report, October 25, 2002. 
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Washington’s ability to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction across 
the world.” 35
 
North Korea confessed to have nuclear weapons program after the 
Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, had confronted Pyongyang 
over its uranium enrichment program during his trip to the country in 
October 2002. North Korea’s newly revealed nuclear program violates 
not only the Agreed Framework of 1994, but also the NPT, the IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement, and the 1991-92 Joint North-South Declaration 
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since the admission of 
having a parallel nuclear weapons program on an uranium basis, Py-
ongyang has rebuffed any U.S., South Korean, and Japanese pressure for 
an immediate end to its nuclear ambitions.  
In January 2003, North Korea pulled out of the nuclear NPT and in 
the same month it restarted its mothballed reactor at Yongbyon, north of 
Pyongyang, by reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that Pyongyang 
took out of storage. Although North Korea will probably need some time 
before it has sufficient highly-enriched uranium to make multiple nu-
clear warheads, Pyongyang has sufficient plutonium to do so as well as 
to construct much less powerful radiological bombs to sell them to inter-
national terrorist groups.  
As it was the case back in the 1994 nuclear crisis, here, too, the U.S. 
has three options: 1) to impose (economic) sanctions; 2) to attack North 
Korea’s nuclear facilities, or 3) to negotiate. Even though the present 
situation on the Korean peninsula may escalate again, the present crisis 
also provides an opportunity for a comprehensive constructive dialogue 
if North Korea cooperates with Washington and allows IAEA inspec-
tions. For the time being, unlike Iraq, Washington favors some diplo-
matic and economic pressure, but no concrete threats of military action 
                                                
35  See Richard Wolffe, Financial Times, November 1, 2002, p. 13, on the rather pragmatic and 
diplomatic policies of the Bush Administration on the Korean peninsula.  
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trying to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. 
Here again we can see a mix of bilateralism (U.S.-North Korea; U.S.-
China), minilateralism (U.S.-South Korea-Japan), and multilateralism 
(six-party talks) in the U.S. foreign and security policies towards Py-
ongyang.  
Looking ahead, U.S. can also offer a peace treaty to replace the armi-
stice signed at the end of the Korean war (1953) and support North Ko-
rea with food, oil, and other shortages. Yet, whatever the U.S. decides to 
do in the forthcoming months, its actions will have implications for other 
regions as well as for the global non-proliferation and arms control poli-
cies.  
For Washington, the room for maneuver and further concessions 
might be much smaller than many international commentators and Py-
ongyang seem to assume. Iran’s declared willingness to sign the addi-
tional protocol, which, for instance, outlines a very robust inspection re-
gime for all suspicious nuclear sites, will inevitably have consequences 
in the North Korean case too. This forthcoming inspection regime will 
be much more intrusive and comprehensive and allow on-site as well as 
ad-hoc inspection without any pre-warning of Iraq or North Korea in 
many cases. In this light, Pyongyang will have to accept a similar 
inspection regime (ad-hoc and every suspicious sites in the view of the 
IAEA) even though it did not agree with the former one which was much 
less intrusive. A less robust inspection regime  — let’s say a special one 
designed for North Korea — seems rather unrealistic and unwise be-
cause 1) it would undermine the global nature of the IAEA inspection 
regime, and 2) the U.S. Congress would never sign and support such a 
less robust inspection regime. 
Furthermore, it is more than questionable whether the U.S. can agree 
on the withdrawal (in contrast to a reduction which the U.S. is already 
contemplating itself) of all 37,000 U.S. soldiers deployed in South Ko-
rea, for it would also question the U.S. deployments in Japan and there-
fore the entire security and defense policies in East Asia. Washington’s 
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original message to North Korea — either abandon the nuclear program 
or submit to international economic isolation — did not work in the past. 
Why should it work now? That might be questionable especially in the 
light of ongoing tendencies of a widening split between Washington and 
its closest ally, South Korea, despite the fact that Seoul and Tokyo are 
close military allies of the U.S. and thus heavily depend on Washing-
ton’s policies. They have already signaled that they (especially South 
Korea) will push ahead with their economic aid in exchange program for 
North Korea’s pledge that it will abandon its nuclear weapons program 
even in the case of Pyongyang’s unwillingness to submit to an effective 
inspection regime. That might not be acceptable to Washington and the 
international community given their global non-proliferation interests. 
Hence, Washington may opt again for more unilateral policy initiatives 
vis-à-vis Pyongyang in the mid-term perspective. Therewith, however, 
the Bush Administration can also open new fronts with China which is at 
present time not interested in any political or military escalations in its 
neighborhood because of its rising domestic problems. 
Pyongyang’s history of brinkmanship is not a reassuring indicator for 
its future cooperation policies either. Furthermore, Kim Dae Jung’s 
“Sunshine-Policy” is more popular abroad than at home where it has of-
ten been criticized as a one-way street of cooperation. Indeed, the new 
revelation of North Korea’s secret nuclear weapons program is the con-
trary of trust as the basis of the Sunshine-Policy of the South Korean 
President. Furthermore, North Korea’s confession also undermined the 
former “Sunshine”-policies of South Korea. Seoul’s future economic 
cooperation with North Korea, such as the restoration of railway links 
across the heavily militarized border can end and lead to a hardened 
stance in Seoul vis-à-vis North Korea, and to unpredictable develop-
ments on the Korean peninsula (though I personally expect some contin-
ued pragmatism on Seoul’s side becoming more dependent on North Ko-
rea’s willingness to cooperate on sensitive security issues, such as the 
demilitarization of the borders). 
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The suspension of the KEDO-program and the light water reactor 
project of November 4, 2003 indicated that the Bush government has no 
interest in negotiating yet another agreement with North Korea similar to 
the 1994 pact after Pyongyang admitted that it did not live up to the pre-
vious one. However, at the same time, it is the only present framework 
that legitimizes IAEA inspections in North Korea. Giving up the agree-
ment would also mean ending the shipments of fuel oil, which would 
exacerbate North Korea’s economic crisis and stop the building of the 
two LWRs. There are still many questions concerning North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program itself. The DPRK’s decision to enrich uranium 
rather than plutonium has both advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, uranium is more reliable and easier to hide. On the other hand, 
it is harder to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile. 
North Korea’s plan is to build a series of centrifuges to separate weap-
ons-grade uranium from lower-grade uranium. Whether North Korea al-
ready has those centrifuges, cannot be confirmed or denied despite the 
information that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment of 
the DPRK’s newly revealed clandestine nuclear weapons-grade pro-
gram.36  Reportedly, North Korea conducted uranium enrichment ex-
periments between last July and August 2002 at one of its secret installa-
tions.37 This also raises the question of how a financially dilapidated 
country was able to proceed with a plan that requires billions of U.S. 
dollars. According to nuclear experts, a uranium enrichment facility 
costs some $1.3 billion to build.38 Meanwhile, the PRC concluded that 
the DPRK obtained enough uranium from a second clandestine program 
to make several more devices.39
                                                
36  See David E. Sanger and James Dao, “U.S. says pakistan gave technology to north korea,” 
The New York Times, October 17, 2002, <www.nytimes.com> (Search Date: October 17, 
2002). 
37  See Korea Now,  November 2, 2002, p. 11. 
38  ibid. 
39  See Michael Sheridan, London Sunday Times, October 27, 2002. 
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Ultimately, only full and free inspections going beyond the limited 
access could establish the full scope of any DPRK nuclear weapons pro-
gram. PR China, for instance, has reportedly warned the U.S. that the 
DPRK has not only 1 or 2 nuclear warheads, but already 3-5 working 
nuclear weapons (or at least the fissile material to build them very 
quickly). Whether Pyongyang already has operational warheads (free 
falling bombs or those for its ballistic missiles) or is just “entitled to 
have powerful countermeasures, including nuclear weapons,” as an offi-
cial North Korean broadcast commentary pointed out40, is unclear. But, 
any inspection regime in North Korea similar to the one now assumed 
for Iran may include not less than almost 12,000 caves in which a secret 
uranium enrichment program or a covert plutonium effort can be hidden. 
Unlike in Iraq, where inspections were conducted between 1991 and 
1998, there has been only one routine inspection of Pyongyang’s de-
clared facilities. This inspection was conducted over a decade ago. Even 
a “phased approach” notwithstanding the Bush Administration’s new of-
fer of multilateral security guarantees (or assurances) remains “condi-
tioned on a verifiable progress” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons dis-
mantlement which at the end is non-negotiable. For the time ahead it 
seems rather impossible that North Korea will ever accept ad-hoc in-
spections of all suspicious sites wherever they are. Ultimately, what the 
U.S. and the IAEA demand from North Korea is nothing less than to 
turn the currently closed political system into a total transparent country 
over night. A less intrusive inspection regime is not realistic either. The 
IAEA-inspection regime is of global nature and would create new 
double standards for the already global arms regimes in crisis.41
                                                
 
 
40  See Global Security Newswire, November 19, 2002. 
41  See also my interview in “NK [North Korea] Crisis Will Make or Break Global Arms Control,” in 
Korea Times, November 25, 2003, and Frank Umbach, “Atommacht Nordkorea – was tun?“ 
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Meanwhile, North Korea demands three conditions for any peaceful 
settlement of the new crisis:  
(1) The U.S. needs to recognize DPRK’s sovereignty; 
(2) Washington assures the DPRK non-aggression, and 
(3) The U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the 
DPRK. 
 
While these North Korean conditions can be fulfilled in one way or 
the other, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang will cooperate with 
the IAEA to establish a comprehensive inspection regime, and whether 
Pyongyang will give up its newly revealed nuclear weapons program. 
Washington has neither the desire nor the sole capability to sign and rat-
ify a peace treaty incorporating North Korean demands. Any ratification 
of a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War requires a two-thirds 
majority in Congress which is unthinkable for the time being given 
North Korea’s ambivalent policies. Despite the U.S. offer of multilateral 
security assurances, it remains questionable whether North Korea will 
perceive them as real security guarantees that the U.S. will not strike 
preemptively in whatever circumstances. Such a real belief in written se-
curity guarantees (Washington offers “assurances” only) contradicts 
North Korea’s juche-ideology and its basic mistrust against all U.S. poli-
cies. Pyongyang seems to interpret U.S. policies on the Korean penin-
sula through the prism of the U.S.-Iraq war including two major steps: 
first, disarming North Korea and second, aiming for regime change in 
Pyongyang. Indeed, a non-aggression pact may only be of symbolical 
importance to North Korea. In the June 2001 issue of Kunin Saengwhal 
(“Soldiers Life”), an internal publication of the North Korean military, 
Kim Jong Il already told his soldiers: 
                                                                                                                                                     
(North Korea as a Nuclear Power – What to Do?), Internationale Politik, (November 2003), pp. 
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“Lessons of the past make it clear that dramatic measures such as treaties 
and agreements cannot prevent a war and cannot secure peace. Even in the 
case we establish diplomatic relations with the United States in the future and 
change the armistice into a peace treaty, that fact will remain unchanged. The 
American imperialists had diplomatic relations with Iraq and Yugoslavia for 
several decades. But once these imperialists came to dislike them, they at-
tacked those countries, turning them into rubble over night.”42
 
Moreover, multilateral security guarantees for North Korea may also 
undermine the bilateral security alliances of the U.S. with South Korea 
and Japan.43 One of the most well-known and internationally respected 
Japanese security experts, Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan’s Na-
tional Defense Academy, argued against those multilateral security guar-
antees last August: 
 
“In the past the DPRK has demanded such an agreement in return for its re-
nouncing its nuclear weapons program and permitting full inspections of its 
nuclear facilities. But, this is a dangerous offer that could eventually backfire 
on the United States. Washington should not sign a pact stating that it has no 
intention launching a nuclear attack on the DPRK. A non-aggression pact 
would be extremely risky. First, how would the signatories ensure that the on-
site inspections of suspected facilities were complete and that the DPRK had in 
fact abandoned its nuclear arms programs? Second, once a non-aggression pact 
was signed, Pyongyang might demand the withdrawal of American troops 
from ROK. It would argue that an American presence on the Korean peninsula 
was no longer needed now that both sides had promised not to wage war 
                                                                                                                                                     
65-68. 
42  The document was revealed by Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congressional Task 
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, in an article in Defense & Foreign Affairs 
Strategic Policy earlier this year. Here quoted as in Danny Gittings, “North Korea’s Trojan 
Horse,” Wall Street Journal Europe, AugU.S.t  21, 2003. 
43  On the background of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance see also Frank Umbach, “The Fu-
ture of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance,” in Manfred Mols and Joern Dosch (eds.), Interna-
tional Relations in the Asia-Pacific, op. cit., pp. 111-154. 
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against each other. Moreover, the ROK public would be likely to support the 
DPRK’s demand. Third, if the American troops left ROK, Pyongyang would 
appeal to its ROK ‘brothers’ to call for a united Korea without a U.S. role. In 
addition, some Japanese, particularly those in Okinawa, would probably argue 
that American bases in Okinawa ought to be downgraded or closed. Finally, 
and most important, a non-aggression pact between the DPRK and the U.S. 
would conflict with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. A DPRK without nuclear 
weapons would still possess biological and chemical weapons and could U.S.e 
them to attack Japan. In such an event, the U.S. forces in Japan could not help 
defend Japan in accordance with their bilateral treaty, since the U.S. would al-
ready have promised not to attack North Korea. Facing that possibility, Tokyo 
could no longer rely on its alliance with Washington and this might decide to 
develop its own retaliatory nuclear weapons. Instead of a non-aggression pact, 
the U.S., together with Japan and ROK, should offer diplomatic recognition to 
Pyongyang.”44
 
As some commentators and experts pointed out, the nuclear issue will 
not be solved except in the context of a broad Korean settlement, in 
which all the regional powers must be involved in one or the other way, 
and in which only a grand bargain with North Korea can be successful.45 
North Korea has more cards to play than just the nuclear one given its 
stockpile of chemical weapons and at least the capability to produce also 
biological weapons in a short time. In order to enhance its operational 
capability to ABC-warfare, North Korea created chemical warfare pla-
toons at the regiment level. With its eight factories to produce chemical 
weapons and other facilities to produce biological weapons46, North Ko-
rea (which is party to the Biological Weapons Convention/BWC, but not 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention/CWC) is able to conduct simulta-
neous chemical and biological attacks on both the front and rear of South 
                                                
44  Mashi Nishihara, “North Korea’s Trojan Horse,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2003. 
45  See Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, “Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea,” 
Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2003), pp. 7-18. 
46  See Lee Sung-yul, The Korea Herald , January 1, 1997, p. 2. 
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Korea with various delivery systems, such as artillery, multi-rocket 
launchers, Scud-missiles as well as aircraft.47  
Theoretically, it is not to exclude that North Korea will give up its 
nuclear weapons program after a lengthy and frustrating negotiation pro-
cess with the U.S. However, the North Korean leadership might have no 
interest at all in releasing the military pressure on South Korea at its 
common border given its overriding regime interests to survive and 
maintain some leverage towards Seoul and the U.S. Hitherto, North Ko-
rea has not honored any international agreements and treaties and will, 
therefore, hardly rely on any peace treaty with the U.S. guaranteeing 
North Korea not to be attacked in the future. Hence, it seems very ques-
tionable whether Pyongyang will give up not only its nuclear weapons 
program but also its chemical and biological weapons arsenal. 
Although most commentators interpreted North Korea’s confession 
as a sign of weakness and a perverse but typical North Korean brink-
man ship strategy to create another crisis in order to pull a reluctant 
Bush Administration into serious dialogue with the regime, it remains to 
be seen whether this “rapprochement by confession” (Alexandre MY. 
Mansourov 48 ) will work. Furthermore, any U.S. attempt to use the 
weapon of economic sanctions in order to push North Korea to give up 
its nuclear weapons program is controversial, risky and doomed to fail. 
Washington might get the opposite of what if initially tried to achieve: 
undermining further North’s Korea economy and social situations which 
can lead to a collapse and widespread unrest. Yet, it is also uncertain 
whether North Korea plays on time. 
Until now, North Korea has not promised to suspend its nuclear pro-
gram nor has it mentioned receiving IAEA inspectors. Pyongyang might 
also have miscalculated the reaction of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo 
                                                
47  See The Korea Herald, August 15, 1996, p. 9 and “North Korea. A Potential Time Bomb,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Report, Special Report No. 2 (1994), p. 8. 
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by showing its frustration after its admission of an continuing nuclear 
program. In many ways, Pyongyang’s negotiation environment has 
rather deteriorated given Japan’s reaction to Pyongyang’s admission of 
abductions and Washington’s future policies which will without doubt 
be harsher and tougher and amount to the complete surrender of all 
North Korea’s remaining negotiation cards. China’s policies are also 
characterized by concern and anger about its former military ally which 
has resulted in an unprecedented pro-active policy that is even willing to 
use its economic leverage (like the suspension of oil deliveries to North 
Korea last February).  
Therefore, a new crisis ahead seems almost inevitable in the next 
years. In this light, it becomes more than important that the trilateral 
Seoul-Tokyo-Washington axis agrees on a grand policy strategy of what 
to do with Pyongyang, as each of the three has common, but also differ-
ent, short- and long-term interests to follow in the forthcoming months. 
How long the U.S. will apply bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral ap-
proaches in Northeast Asia depends on U.S. common strategic interests 
and domestic policies. U.S. policies were based on the fact that Wash-
ington believed that time is on its side and that it can simply wait for 
North Korea to collapse. As Marcus Noland has stated: “If regime 
change is the strategy, sitzkrieg is the tactic.”49 Correspondingly, the 
Bush Administration dismissed any North Korean claims that it has re-
started its nuclear weapon program at Yongbyon by reprocessing previ-
ously sealed and monitored fuel spent to extract plutonium for a nuclear 
weapons option. This might be another intelligence failure like the one 
with the Taepodong missile launch in August 1998 when U.S. intelli-
gence dismissed information that North Korea was able to launch a 
three-stage ballistic missile. 
                                                                                                                                                     
48  Alexandre MY. Mansourov, “The Kelly Process, Kim Jong Il’s Grand Strategy, and the Dawn of 
a Post-Agreed Framework Era on the Korean Peninsula,” NAPSNET-Special Report, October 
22, 2002. 
49  Marcus Noland, Financial Times, January 23, 2004, p. 17. 
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During a brainstorming conference on the new nuclear crisis in North 
Korea, four future scenarios were discussed in October 2002.50 Charac-
teristically for the present stalemate, all four scenarios led to some sort 
of crisis with the existing Agreed Framework:  
 
(1) “Gridlock”: the Agreed Framework collapses and North Korea 
pursues its nuclear weapons program undeterred. Japan and 
South Korea may follow suit. The NPT collapses and Washing-
ton favors to have nuclear-armed allies. 
 
(2) “Great Leader III”: the U.S. wants to end the Agreed Frame-
work while Seoul wants to maintain it which leads eventually to 
a break of the bilateral alliance. The result could be a growing 
U.S. disengagement in Northeast Asia while South Korea moves 
closer to China and North Korea. 
 
(3) “Phoenix”: the Agreed Framework collapses, but China prevails 
upon the U.S. not to respond militarily. Beijing and Washington 
cooperate to isolate North Korea economically and politically. It 
could lead to an implosion/collapse of North Korea and a Ger-
man-style re-unification process with South Korea. 
 
(4) “Rainbow”: the crisis can be averted through new negotiations, 
resulting in a normalization of relations with North Korea in ex-
change for a verifiable end to North Korea’s nuclear program. 
This leads to an overall reduction of regional tensions and an in-
                                                
50  Timothy Savage, “Pyongyang’s Dangerous Game,” NAPSNET-Special Report, October 24, 
2002. 
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flow of development aid from many countries in the region and 
beyond. 
 
 
In this light, one might follow the Russian expert Pavel Felgenhauer 
who remarks skeptically: “The Cold War non-proliferation region is vir-
tually dead today. The new U.S. doctrine of preventive non-proliferation 
has yet to prove its effectiveness, while the nightmare of a multipolar 
nuclear world is materializing.”51
Although the Bush Administration follows a pragmatic and coopera-
tive approach towards North Korea, it remains to be seen whether Py-
ongyang will be forthcoming with concrete cooperation with the U.S. 
and the IAEA. Then again, although almost all military options seem to 
be excluded as too dangerous, Washington might feel forced to take uni-
lateral approaches rather than present minilateral or multilateral ap-
proaches to “solve” the new North Korean crisis if Seoul and Tokyo de-
cide to adopt policies different from Washington. Hence, a close coop-
eration among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo is the most important pre-
requisite for any future negotiations with North Korea. For Pyongyang, 
its 2003 policies of the nuclear crisis apparently failed to accomplish 
anything more than ensuring the regime’s survival. For the future that 
might not be enough – neither for Pyongyang, nor for Beijing or any-
body else in the Six-Party Talks or in the region and beyond. Mean-
while, Pyongyang is even disputing that it has ever admitted to have an 
enriched uranium program. This has strengthened doubts in South Korea 
and Beijing whether North Korea has really a covert program to enrich 
uranium for nuclear weapons. A recent private U.S. delegation in North 
Korea could only confirm that the spent fuel facility was empty and that 
                                                
51  Pavel Felgenhauer, “Multipolar nuke nightmare,” The Moscow Times, October 24, 2002. 
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the 8,000 spent fuel rods indeed were removed to a new unknown place. 
One member of this group, Siegfried Hecker (former director of the U.S. 
nuclear research center in Los Alamos), is convinced that the North Ko-
reans have the equipment and the expertise for reprocessing as well as 
enriching uranium in order to produce plutonium which they already did. 
However, he is still not convinced that the North Koreans also have the 
expertise to build nuclear warheads for missiles themselves.52 At the 
same time, the U.S. intelligence credibility is also increasingly been 
questioned in regard to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities 
given the Iraq intelligence debacle on Bagdad’s arsenal of WMD which 
couldn’t be found until now. 
In the meantime, Washington and Pyongyang seem willing to begin 
their Six-Party-Talks without a joint statement agreed on in advance, al-
beit an open-ended session could result in little movement by either side 
if no timeline for conclusion will be established. The best case scenario 
under these extremely difficult circumstances is the hope that the next 
Six-Party-Talks will result in a more regular and institutionalized proc-
ess that could last for months if not years without such a timeline. Yet, 
given the domestic policies and the impacts of the nuclear crisis beyond 
the Korean peninsula it remains uncertain whether the rest of the world, 
including People’s Republic China, will have the patience to wait until a 
fundamental change of thinking and policies emerges in North Korea as 
it has recently happened in Libya and Iran (as it looks now). 
 
 
V. Conclusions and Perspectives 
 
                                                
52  See Jim Yardley, “Group of Private U.S. Experts Visits North Korea Nuclear Plant,” The New 
York Times, January 10, 2004, <www.nytimes.com> (Search Date: January 10, 2004), and 
Andrew Tully, “North Korea: U.S. Nuclear Expert Finds no Hard Evidence of a Bomb,” Radio 
Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Feature Articles, January 22, 2004. 
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“The greatest danger posed by the new shape of Asia, especially for status 
quo powers such as the United States and Japan, is that populist pressures and 
changing technology will incite a destabilizing struggle over the regional bal-
ance of power. The perils implicit in such a struggle are especially acute be-
cause Northeast Asia, unlike Europe or even Southeast Asia, has no regional 
institutions capable of muting paranoid perceptions and setting mutual 
goals.”53
 
For the time being, only a new multilateral organization for the Ko-
rean peninsula or the entire Northeast Asian region, based on the former 
existing foundations and structures, such as the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work, KEDO and the 2+2 forum and track-2 security dialogue forums, 
may offer a realistic framework for the months and years to come. 
Within such a new regional, multilateral security structure, the U.S. has 
the freedom to conduct a varying mix of unilateralist, bilateralist, mini-
lateralist, and multilateralist approaches vis-à-vis Pyongyang depending 
on the specific and different security problems to solve, such as persuad-
ing North Korea not only to give up its nuclear weapons programs but 
also its chemical and biological ones as well as the export of ballistic 
missiles, and to demilitarize the common border with its southern breth-
ren. Hence, the future security order in Northeast Asia is likely to be 
multi-layered, involving various elements of unilateral military prepar-
edness, alliance structures, bilateral diplomatic instruments, and new 
multilateral institutions for dialogue as well as consultation with regional 
organizations for promoting economic interaction and managing con-
crete security problems, such as North Korea’s nuclear aspirations. A 
more far-reaching concept of multilateralism establishing a real “security 
community” (such as NATO in Europe) is based on a wide-ranging and 
deep identification between its members which is transcending military 
                                                
53  Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January-
February, 2001), pp. 106-119 (121). 
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and strategic as well as general economic considerations. At present, 
however, such a future seems still far away in Northeast Asia. 
In regard to the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula, North 
Korea’s declared nuclear weapon’s program and the uncertainties around 
the future Six-Party-Talks, all unresolved security issues ultimately boil 
down to the North Korean regime interests and its survival which com-
plicate and hinder a peaceful “great solution” for the Korean peninsula. 
Although the hard-line and sometimes confrontational approach of the 
Bush Administration has hindered and complicated a peaceful solution 
of the unresolved security problems on the Korean peninsula during the 
last three years, at the same time, the ability of North Korea to play dip-
lomatic games or conduct blackmail policies on security issues has de-
creased considerably during the last two years. 
Despite the numerous track-two channels existing in East Asia, re-
gional countries in Northeast Asia have still different concepts of what 
regional co-operation means and how it can be achieved. Furthermore, 
multilateralism in itself is not a “magical formula” for transforming 
power politics automatically into co-operative international behavior and 
corresponding strategies in order to solve regional security dilemmas. 
Yet, regional co-operation creates norms and rules for interstate behavior 
needed to establish institutions to manage specific security conflicts, de-
pending on the right circumstances and pre-conditions, such as the po-
litical will of all its members (like encouraging a great security and mili-
tary cooperation between Japan and South Korea). Nonetheless, this is 
precisely the reason why a permanent sub-regional security organization 
is so much needed in North-East Asia. 
Furthermore, the future of multilateral co-operation in Northeast Asia 
seems largely in Chinese hands. Although Beijing views multilateralism 
in a more positive light than it was the case in the mid-1990s, and al-
though Beijing has made positive experience in achieving its aims and 
objectives not just on bilateral levels, China’s policies are still deter-
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mined by strong principles about sovereignty and non-interference in 
domestic affairs for historical reasons, and its ambitions for a “great 
power” status. In this context, multilateralism seems both impossible and 
inevitable for China. Yet, as Paul Evans and Akiko Fukushima rightly 
argue: “It will only be inevitable if China will it so.” 54
The present crisis on the Korean peninsula can be seen as the most 
important litmus test for China’s evolving and changing foreign and se-
curity policies as well as the question whether and to which extent China 
is willing to take over regional and global responsibility for international 
crisis management. While China’s policies on the Korean peninsula have 
become more active and with Beijing’s perceptions of North Korea as a 
potential security liability, indicated by the severely strained bilateral re-
lationship with North Korea during the last years, a divided Korea has 
still advantages for China which explains that Beijing is at present pre-
ferring the unstable status quo instead for opting for a regime change. 
Whatever the outcome of the recent crisis on the Korean peninsula will 
be in the next months, it will lead to long-term changes in Beijing’s poli-
cies towards the Korean peninsula, China’s foreign and security policies 
in general and the future multilateralism in Northeast-Asia.  
 
 
 
[Reference] 
 
 
Christopher Hemmer, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Col-
lective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” Interna-
tional Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002) pp. 575-607. 
Umbach, Frank, Kooperation oder Konflikt in Asien-Pazifik? Chinas Einbindung in re-
gionale Sicherheitsstrukturen und die Auswirkungen für Europa (Cooperation 
                                                
54  Paul Evans and Akiko Fukushima, “Northeast Asia’s Future Security Framework,”  op. cit., p. 
35. 
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
223
or Conflict in Asia-Pacific. China’s Tying into Regional Security Structures 
and the Implications for Europe) (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002). 
______, “Nuclear Energy Issues – Global Dimensions and Security Challenges,“ in 
Bruno Tertrais (ed.), Nuclear Issues in the Post-September 11 Era (Paris: 
Fondation pout la Recherche Stratégique, 2003), pp. 25-46. 
______, “Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Cooperation 
- A View from Europe,” in Kurt W. Radtke and Raymond Feddema (eds.), 
Comprehensive Security in Asia. Views from Asia and the West  on a Chang-
ing Security Environment and Their Implications for Europe (Lei-
den/Boston/Cologne: Brill 2000), pp. 66-133. 
______, “Strategic Trends of Global Denuclearization and Nuclearization - Implica-
tions for Japan's Security Policies, Regional Stability and the TMD-Debate in 
East Asia,” Hiroshima Peace Science, No. 27, (April 2001), pp. 63-118. 
_______, “The Future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance,” in Manfred Mols and 
Joernrn Dosch (eds.), International Relations in the Asia-Pacific. New Pat-
terns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation (Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 2000) and 
(New York: St. Martins press, 2000), pp. 87-110. 
_______, “U.S.-Foreign and Security Policy of the Bush-Administration: Unilateral-
ism, Bilateralism, Multilateralism or Minilateralism vis-à-vis North Korea and 
its Nuclear Ambitions?,” Asia-Pacific Security Forum 2002: “Asian-Pacific 
Security Environment: Emerging Realities,” in Hawaii (November 9-10, 
2002). 
Dosch, Joern, “Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and the Role of the United States,” in Joern 
Dosch and Manfred Mols (eds.), International Relations in the Asia-Pacific. 
New Patterns of Power, Interest, and Cooperation (Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, 
2000) and (New York: St. Martins press, 2000), pp. 87-110. 
_______, Die Herausforderung des Multilateralismus: Amerikanische Asien-Pazifik-
Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (The Challenge of Multilateralism. American 
Asia-Pacific Policies after the Cold War) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002). 
Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1 
(January-February, 2001), pp. 106-119(121). 
“North Korea. A Potential Time Bomb,” Jane’s Intelligence Report, Special Report 
No. 2, (1994). 
Paul Evans and Akiko Fukushima, “Northeast Asia’s Future Security Framework: Be-
yond Bilateralism?,” NIRA Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 31-35. 
Timothy Savage, “Pyongyang’s Dangerous Game,” NAPSNET-Special Report, (Octo-
ber 24, 2002). 
 
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
224
 
 
 
Alexandre MY. Mansourov, “The Kelly Process, Kim Jong Il’s Grand Strategy, and the 
Dawn of a Post-Agreed Framework Era on the Korean Peninsula,” NAPSNET-
Special Report, (October 22, 2002). 
Andrew Mack, “A huge Headache for Washington,” International Herald Tribune , 
October 24, 2002. 
Andrew Tully,  “North Korea: U.S. Nuclear Expert Finds no Hard Evidence of a 
Bomb,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Feature Articles, January 22, 2004. 
Charles Recknagel, “U.S./EU: As Congress Debates Iraq, Europeans See Growing 
American Unilateralism,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Analyses, (Octo-
ber 3, 2002). 
Danny Gittings, “North Korea’s Trojan Horse,” Wall Street Journal Europe, AugU.S.t 
21, 2003. 
Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-
Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly (Winter 2001), pp. 7-
17. 
Department of Defence, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Washington D.C. 
(September 30, 2001). 
Edward Foster et. al., “How to Make Friends and Influence People,” Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, September 11, 2002. 
Francis Fukuyama, “Das Ende des Westens, ” Die Welt, September 3, 2002. 
Frank Umbach, “Atommacht Nordkorea – was tun?” (North Korea as a Nuclear Power 
– What to Do?), Internationale Politik (November 2003), pp. 65-68. 
_______, “World Gets Wise to Pyongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail – Part One,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (September 1999), pp. 33-36.  
_______, “World Gets Wise to Pyongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail – Part Two,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (October 1999), pp. 35-39. 
Frank Umbach`s interview “NK [North Korea] Crisis Will Make or Break Global Arms 
Control,” in Korea Times, November 25, 2003. 
George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 
Washington D.C., September 17, 2002. 
Jackson Diehl, “Rice produces a brilliant synthesis,” International Herald Tribune, Ja-
nuary 10, 2002. 
“Japan Threatens Force against N Korea,” BBC-News, February 13, 2003. 
John H. Cushman Jr., “Rattling new Sabers,” The New York Times, March 10, 2002. 
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
225
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure– Part 
One,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 1999).  
_______, “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure– Part Two,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (August 1999).  
Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, “Conclusion of Non-Aggression Treaty be-
tween DPRK and U.S. Called for Pyongyang,”, NAPSNET-Daily Report (Oc-
tober 25, 2002). 
Mashi Nishihara, “North Korea’s Trojan Horse,” The Washington Post, AugU.S.t 14, 
2003. 
Michael Krepon, “Weakening the anti-proliferation fight,” International Herald 
Tribune, February 10, 2002. 
Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, “Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea,” 
Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 2003), pp. 7-18. 
Paul Kennedy, “Power and terror,” Financial Times, September 3, 2002. 
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Multipolar nuke nightmare,” The Moscow Times, October 24, 
2002. 
Ralph Cossa, “Asian multilateralism takes on new energy,”  The Japan Times, July 30, 
2002. 
Victor Cha, “A Multilateral Deal for N Korea,” Financial Times, October 22, 2003. 
 
 
Agence France-presse (March 13, 2002). 
Andrew Ward, Financial Times (November 3, 2003). 
Global Security Newswire (November 19, 2002). 
Korea Now  (November 2, 2002). 
Lee, Sung-yul, The Korea Herald (January 1, 1997). 
Marcus Noland, Financial Times (January 23, 2004). 
Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune (June 6, 2002). 
Michael Sheridan, London Sunday Times (October 27, 2002). 
Richard Wolffe, Financial Times (November  1, 2002). 
Stephen Fidler, Financial Times (September 21-22, 2002). 
The Korea Herald (August 15, 1996) 
David E. Sanger and James Dao, “U.S. says pakistan gave technology to north korea,” 
The New York Times, October 17, 2002, <www.nytimes.com> (Search Date: 
October 17, 2002).  
Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report 2002,” (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense,2002), here, “Experpts,” 
  
                                           The Future of Multilateralism in Asia 
 
226
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.html> (Search 
date: February 3, 2004). 
Jim Yardley, “Group of Private U.S. Experts Visits North Korea Nuclear Plant,” The 
New York Times, January 10, 2004, <www.nytimes.com> (Search Date: Janu-
ary 10, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
